Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
8-31-1964
Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and
Surgeons
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons 61 Cal.2d 750 (1964).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/463
750 HOLT v. COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIO 
PHYSICIANS & SUBGEONS 
[L. A. No. 26995. In Bank. Aug. 31, 1964.] 
[61 C.2d 
J .. FRANK HOLT et a1., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. 
COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIC PHYSICIANS AND 
SURGEONS' et al, Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Oha.ritiea--:Aetions-Parties.-Nothing in Corp. Code, 1§9505, 
10207, providing that if there is a failure to comply with a 
charitable trust the Attorney General shall institute, in the 
name of the state, the proceedings necessary to correct the 
noncompliance or departure, or in th-e Uniform Supervision 
of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act (Gov. Code, §§ 12580-
12595) precludes trustees from bringing an action to enforce 
the trust. ' 
[2] Id.-Actions-Parties.-Corp. Code, I§ 9505, 10207, author-
izing the Attorney General to bring an action to enforce a 
charitable trust, and the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for 
Charitable Purposes Act (Gov. Code, §§12580-12595) were 
enacted in recognition of the problem of providing adequate 
supervision and enforcement of charitable trusts. 
[8] Id.-Actions-With Respect to Oharitable 'l'rusts.-In deter-
nlining that legal action by his office against a charitable 
trust was not warranted because the changes in the operation 
of the charitable institution would not be dt'trimental to the 
public interest, the Attorney General used an incorrect test; 
a trust is not fulfilled merely by applying the assets in the 
public interest, but by using them only for the purposes for 
which they were received in trust. 
[4] Id.-Actions-Parties.-The Attorney General has primary 
responsibility for the enforcement of charitable trusts, but 
the need for adequate enforcement is not wholly fulfilled by 
the authority given him; there is no rule or policy against 
supplementing his power of enforcement by allowing other 
responsible individuals, such as trustees of a charitable trust, 
to sue in behalf of the charity. 
[6] Id.-Aetions-Parties.-Permitting suits to enforce a chari-
table trust by the charitable trustees. does not usurp the 
Attorne:y\ General's responsibility, since he would be a neces-
sary party to such litigation and would represent the public 
interest. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Charities, § 39; Am.Jur.2d, Charities, § 118 
et seq. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-6, 9] Charities, § 40; [3, 7, 8] 
Charities, § 39(2). 
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[6] Id.-Actions-l"arties.-Minority trustees of • charitable cor-
poration have the capacity to bring an action in behalf of the 
corporation against the majority trustees to enjoin any 
threatened breach of trust. (Disapproving George Pepperdine 
Foundation v. Pepperdine, 126 Cal.App.2d 154 [271 P.2d 600] 
to the extent that it is contrary to this opinion.) 
[7] Id.-Actions-With ltespect to Oharitable Trusts.-A cause of 
action for enjoining a threatened breach of a charitable trust 
was stated by a complaint alleging that the charitable purpose 
of the trust was primarily to conduct a college of osteopathy 
for the training of osteopathic physicians and surgeons and 
for the general furtherance of the profession of osteopathy, 
that there was a distinction between osteopathic and allopathic 
medicine, and that it was proposed to change the curriculum 
of the college or to take other steps to gain accreditation as an 
allopathic medical college, and to train allopathic physicians 
and surgeons. 
[8] Id.-Actions-With Respect to Oharitable Trusts.-A cause 
of action for declaratory relief was stated by a complaint 
alleging that a controversy existed between minority trustees 
of a charitable trust and the majority trustees over their rights 
and duties as trustees of the charitable corporation; the 
minority trustees were entitled to a judicial declaration of 
the charitable purposes of the trust and whether certain con-
duct by the trustees would be contrary to these purposes and 
therefore a breach of trust. 
[9] Id.-Actions-Parties. - Where the minority trustees of a 
charitable corporation engaged in operating a college of oste-
opathy for the training of osteopathic physicians and. surgeons 
sought to enjoin performance by the college of a contract 
between the college and the California Osteopathic Associa-
tion, the effect of a decree would be to enjoin the association 
as well as the college and the association was thus an indis-
pensable party. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Leon T. David, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to enjoin breach of a charitable trust and for declara-
tory relief with regard to operation of a charitable corporation. 
Judgment of dismissal after demurrer to complaint was sus-
tained without leave to amend,lreversed. 
Mitcllell, Silberberg & Knupp, Arthur Groman and Howard 
S. Smith for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
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Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Carl Boronkay, Deputy 
Attorney General, Belcher, Benzie &; Biegenzahn, Belcher, 
Benzie & Fargo, George M. Benzie and Seth M. B ufstedler 
for Defendants and Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dis-
missal entered after the sustaining of a demurrer to their 
complaint without leave to amend in an action to enjoin the 
breach of a charitable trust and for declaratory relief. 
Plaintiffs are three trustees of defendant College of Osteo-
pathic Physicians and Surgeons (hereinafter COPS), a Cali-
fornia charitable corporation. The other defendants are the 
23 remaining trustees on the COPS board of trustees and 
the Attorney General. The complaint alleges in substance 
that COPS holds assets in excess of $1,500,000 in trust for 
charitable purposes, and that defendant trustees have acted 
contrary to these purposes and threaten other such acts. By 
their first cause of action plaintiffs seek to enjoin these acts, 
and by their second cause of action they seek a declaration 
of their and defendants' rights and duties with regard to the 
operation of COPS. 
The Attorney General filed an answer to the complaint 
denying for want of information and belief the allegations 
that defendant trustees were diverting the assets of COPS 
from its charitable purposes. As an affirmative defense the 
Attorney General stated that "The matter,of proposed changes 
in the operation of said College was reviewed by the Attorney 
General to determine whether such changes would constitute 
a violation of a charitable trust warranting institution of a 
suit by this office to remedy the situation. It has been con-
cluded that the changes to be made in the· operation of said 
College would not be detrimental to the public interest and 
do not warrant legal action by this office to prevent such 
changes. " The Attorney General also stated that he had 
not granted "relator status" to plaintiffs and had not con-
sented to' their bringing this action. Defendant trustees 
demurred to the complaint and the trial court sustained the 
demurrer on the grounds tbat plaintiffs have no capacity to 
bring this action and that the c.omplaint does not state facts 
showing a threatened breach of a charitable trust. 
The first issue is whether plaintiffs, as minority trustees 
of a charitable corporation, can sue the majority trnstees to 
enjoin their allegedly wrongful diversion of corporate assets 
) 
) 
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in breach of a trust for charitable purposes. Defendants con-
tend that only the Attorney General can bring such an action. 
The prevailing view of other jurisdictions is that the At-
torney General does not have exclusive power to enforce a 
charitable trust and that a trustee or other person having 
a sufficient special interest may also bring an action for this 
purpose.1 This position is adopted by the American Law 
Institute (Rest. 2d Trusts, § 391) and is supported by many 
legal scholars. (Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: 
An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 433, 443-
449; 4 Scott, Trusts (2d ed.) § 391; 4 Pomeroy, Equity (5th 
ed.) 287, n. 13; see also Note 62 A.L.R. 881; 4 Witkin, Sum-
mary of Cal. Law (7th ed.) 2918-2919.) 
In accord with the majority view, this court has stated 
that ". . . the only person who can object to the disposition 
of the trust property is one having some definite interest in 
the property-he must be a trustee, or a cestui, or have some 
reversionary interest in the trust property." (O'Hara v. 
Orand Lodge I.O.O.T., 213 Cal. 131, 140 [2 P.2d 21] ; see also 
People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129. 136 [48 P. 270, 35 L.R.A. 
269] ; Pratt v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 15 CalApp.2d 
630, 640-641 [59 P.2d 862] ; cf. St. James Church v. Superior 
Court, 135 CalApp.2d 352, 360 {287 P.2d 387].} 
[1] Defendants invoke Corporations Code sections 9505 
and 10207 for the proposition that only the Attorney General 
can bring an action for the enforcement of a charitable 
trust administered by either a nonprofit or charitable· cor-
1 (D'Uffee v. JOfleB, 208 Ga. 639 [68 B.E.2d 699, 703); JenkintJ v. Berry, 
119 Ky. 850 [88 B.W. 594, 597); Sister Elizabeth Kenny Foundation v. 
NafionGl FoundatiOfl, 267 Minn. 852 [126 N.W.2d 640, 646); Dickey 
v. Volker, 821 Mo. 285 [11 B.W.2d 278, 281, 62 A.L.R. 858]; Bouhegan 
Nat. Bonk v. KenisOfl, 92 N.H. 117 [26 A.2d 26, SO]; DiCrisfofaro v. 
La'Urel Gr01Je Memorial Park, 48 N.J. Buper. 244 [128 A.2d 281, 284]; 
TrlUJtee. of Bailor.' Sn'Ug Harbor v. Carmody, 158 App.Div. 738 [144 
N.Y.S. 24,87], affd. 211 N.Y. 286 [105 N.E. 543, 546]; Shields v. Harris, 
190 N.C. 520 [180 B.E. 189, 192]; ~gan v. Uflited State8 Nat. Bank, 227 
Ore. 619 [868 P.2d 765, 769); Wiegand v. Barnes F01lndationtJ, 874 Pa. 
149 [97 A.2d.81, 82·83] ; Cle1!enger v. Rio Farms (Tex.Civ.App.) 204 B.W. 
3d 40, 45·46: CZar1e v. Oli1!er, 91 Va. 421 [22 B.E. 175, 176]; Nash v. 
Morley. 49 Eng. Reprint 545, 547-548; see also Thurlow v. Berry, 247 Ala. 
631 [25 So.2d 726, 733]; CannOfliv. StephentJ, 18 Del. Ch. 276 [159 A. 234, 
286·287]; HoZilen Hospital Corp. v. SO'Uthern. Ill. Hospital Corp., 22 m. 
2d 150 [174 N.E.2d 793, 796); Gilbert v. MoLeod Iflfirmary, 219 B.C. 
174 [64 B.E.2d 524, 528, 24 A.L.R.2d 60]; Bellows Free .Aoademy v. 
Sowle., 76 Vt. 412 [57 A. 996, 999].) 
) 
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poration. These sections provide that if there is a failure 
to comply with a charitable trust". • • the Attorney General 
shall institute, in the name of the State, the proceedings 
necessary to correct the noncompliance or departure." Nothing 
in these sections suggests that. trustees are precluded from 
bringing an action to enforce the trust. The Uniform Super-
vision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act (Gov. Code, 
§§ 12580-12595) similarly authorizes the Attorney General to 
supervise charitable trusts, and likewise fails to preclude suits 
by trustees. 
ra] The foregoing statutes were enacted in recognition of 
the problem of providing. adequate supervision and enforce-
ment of charitable trusts.' Beneficiaries of a charitable trust, 
unlike beneficiaries of a private trust, are ordinarily indef-
inite and therefore unable to enforce the trust in their own 
behalf. (E.g., People v. Oogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 136-137 [45 
P. 270, 35 L.R.A. 269] ; Pratt v. Security Trust 4: Sav. Bank, 
15 Cal.App.2d 630, 639-641 [59 P.2d 862].) Since there 
is usually no one willing to assume the burdens of a legal 
action, or who could properly represent the interests of the 
trust or the public, the Attorney General has been empowered 
to oversee charities as the representative of the public, a 
practice having 'its origin in the early common law. (See 
generally Scott, supra, § 391, pp. 2753.2756.) 
In addition to the general public interest, however, there 
is the interest of donors who have directed that their con-
tributions be used for certain charitable purposes. Although 
the public in general may benefit from any number of chari-
table purposes, charitable contributions must be used only 
for the purposes for which they were received in trust. 
(O'Hara v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T., supra, 213 Cal. at pp. 140-
141; Pacific Home v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 41 Ca1.2d 844, 
854 [264 P.2d 539]; see also Estate of Faulkner, 128 Cal. 
App.2d 575, 578 [275 P.2d 818].) Moreover, part of the 
problem of enforcement is to bring to light conduct detri-
mental to a charitable trust so that remedial action may be 
• 
'This problem has been extensively diaeussed in recent years. (Bee 
Karst, The Efficiency of the ChGritable Dollar: .Af/, Unfulfilled 8'Gte 
Re8p01l8ibiZity, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 433; Bogert, Prop08ed LegislG'ioft Rego.rd. 
iflg 8'0.16 8upertlisiofl. of ChGritie8, 52 Yieh.L.Rev. 633; Bogert, Recen. 
Developtllt'nt8 BegGrdiflg the LGw of C1tGrito.ble Donations and C1tarito.bZe 
Trust8, 21 U .Chi.L.Rev. 118; Note, 8tG'e Bvper1lision of the .Admiflis· 
tro.tioft 0/ Charitable Trud8, 47 Colum.L.Rcv. 659; Note, The ChoritGbZe 
'. Corporo.tiOft, 64 Han.L.Rev. 1168.) 
)' 
) 
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taken. The Attorney General may not be in a position to 
become aware of wrongful conduct or to be sufficiently familiar 
with the situation to appreciate its impact, and the various 
responsibilities of his office may also tend to make it burden-
some for him to institute legal actions except in situations 
of serious public detriment. (See Karst, supra,73 Harv.L.Rev. 
at pp. 478-479; Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State 
Supervision of Charit'ies, 52 Mich.L.Rev. 633, 634-636; Scott, 
supra, § 391, pp. 2754-2756.) 
The present case illustrates these difficulties. [8] The plead-
ing rued by the Attorney General stated that he had no 
information or helief as to the plaintiffs' allegations that 
trust assets were being diverted from their charitable pur-
pose. Yet the pleading also stated that the Attorney General 
determined tl1at legal action by his office was not warranted 
because the changes in the operation of COPS "would not 
be detrimental to the public interest. . . ." The test applied 
by the Attorney General in deciding not to take legal action 
is clearly incorrect, for the assets of COPS as a charitable 
institution can be used only for the purposes for which they 
were received in trust. The trust is not fulfilled merely by 
applying the assets in the public interest.' 
[4] Although the Attorney General has primary responsi-
bility for the enforcement of charitable trusts, the need for 
adequate enforcement is not wholly fulfilled by the authority 
given him. The protection of charities from harassing litiga-
tion does not require that only the Attorney General be 
permitted to bring legal actions in their behalf. This consid-
eration " .•• is quite inapplicable to enforcement by the 
fiduciaries who are both few in number and charged with the 
duty of managing the charity's affairs." (Karst, supra, 73 
Barv.L.Rev. at pp. 444-445.) There is no rule or policy 
against supplementing the Attorney General's power of 
enforcement by allowing other responsible individuals to sue 
in behalf of the charity.4 The administration of chari.table 
'We are Dot presented with the applieabllity of the Q-Pl'6ll doctrine, 
which permits change of charitable purposes under lome circumstances. 
(Bee, e.g., Estate of Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 436 [175 P.2d 524]; O'Hara 
v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T., ,upra, 213 Cal. at pp. 140·141.) 
4Defendant trustees' reference to the safeguards afforded in the area 
of private corporations (Corp. Code, 1834) is inapplicable, since trust.ees 
as fiduciaries have a special interest wholly unlike that of a private cor-
porate shareholder. We do Dot reach the question whether minority 
directors of a private corporation can bring an action in· behalf of the 
) 
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trusts stands only to benefit if in addition to the Attorney 
General other suitable means of enforcement are available. 
"The charity's own representative has at least as much interest 
in preserving the charitable funds as does the Attorney Gen-
eral who represents the general public. The cotrustee is also 
in the best position to learn about breaches of trust and to 
bring the relevant facts to a court's attention." (Karst, supra, 
73 Harv.L.Rev. at p. 444.) [6] Moreover, permitting suits 
by trustees does not usurp the responsibility of the Attorney 
General, since he would bea necessary party to such litigation 
and would represent the public interest. (See In re Los 
Angeles County Pioneer Society, 40 Ca1.2d 852, 861 [257 
P.2d 1].) 
Defendant trustees urge that a distinction should be made 
between trustees of a charitable trust and the governing board 
of a charitable corporation. They apparently concede that a 
minority trustee of a charitable trust has the capacity to sue, 
but contend that members of a governing board of a charitable 
corporation are not truly trustees· and that a diiferentrule 
applies to them. The Attorney General takes the position 
that he is the only one empowered to bring suit in either 
situation. Corporations Code section 10205 states that the 
powers of a charitable corporation shall be vested in a "board 
of trustees." Defendant trustees contend, however, that this 
title does not disclose their true status, that it is the corpora-
tion as a legal entity that is properly designated the trustee 
of the assets held in trust for charitable purposes, and that 
the members of the board are merely employeeS of the cor-
porate trustee. 
It is true that trustees of a charitable corporation do not 
have all the attributes of a trustee of a charitable trust. They 
do not hold legal title to corporate property (see Corp. Code, 
§ 10206, subd. (d» and they are not individually liable for 
corporate liabilities (Corp. Code, § 9504) .. The individual 
trustees in either case, however, are the ones solely responsible 
for administering the trust assets (Corp. Code, § 10205), and 
in both eases they are fiduciaries· in performing their trust 
duties. (St."James Church v. Sflperior Court, 135 Cal.App.2d 
352, 361 [287 P.2d 387].) Rules governingcbaritable trusts 
ordinarily apply to charitable corporations. (Karst, supra, 
1 
eorporation. (Of. S/lalMtd I"". Corp. T. IffnprVtt, 1M., 190 Oal.A.pp.Sa 
805 [12 Cal.Rptr. 158].) The aUfereneee between private and charitable 
eorporationa make the consideration of wch an analol7 value1eaa. 
) 
Aug. 1964] BOLT V. COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATmC 
PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 
[81 C.2c1 '150: 40 Cal.J\ptr. Uf •• <& P.Id IUJ 
757 
73 Harv.L.Rev. at pp. 435-436; Rest.2d Trusts, supra, § 348, 
p. 212; Scott, supra, § 348.1, p. 2559; Comment, Trusts-Gifts 
to Charitable Corporations, 26 So.Cal.L.Rev. 80, 85.) There 
is no sound reason why minority directors or "trustees" of a 
cllaritable corporation cannot maintain an action against 
majority trustees when minority trustees of a charitable trust 
are so empowered. 
The rules governing private trusts also support plaintiffs ' 
position with respect to the enforcement of a charitable trust. 
It is settled that one trustee of a private trust may sue a co-
trustee to enjoin conduct by him that violates the trust, not-
withstanding the right of the beneficiaries to bring an action 
in their own behalf. (E.g., Estate of Hensel, 144 Ca1.App.2d 
429, 438 [301 P.2d 105]; Stanton v. Preis, 138 Cal.App.2d 
104, 106 [291 P.2d 118) ; Rest. 2d Trusts, supra, § 200, com-
ment e.) It follows a !m·tioN that a charitable trust should be 
enforceable by one or more of its trustees, since its indefinite 
class of beneficiaries is ordinarily not able to protect its own 
interest by legal action.6 
[6] Plaintiff trustees therefore have the capacity to bring 
an action in behalf of COPS against the majority trustees to 
enjoin any breach of trust that is threatened. To the extent 
it is contrary to this opinion, George Pepperdine Foundation 
v. Pepperdine, 126 Ca1.App.2d 154 [271 P.2d600), is dis-
approved. 
The question remains whether the complaint states a cause 
of action. A summary of the complaint follows. The articles 
of incorporation of COPS state its charitable purposes to be: 
"To establish, maintain, carryon and conduct an osteo-
pathic medical and surgical college, in which all branches of 
learning, and instruction which now pertain or which may in 
the future pertain to the science and art of health mainte-
nance; prevention, relief and recovery from disease, as well 
as any or all academic subjects desirable or necessary as a 
foundation for the teaching of such branches." [sic) 
Osteopathic medicine, unlike allopathic medicine, placE'S 
68t. Jo.mea Church v. Superior Court, npra, 135 Cal.A.pp.2d 352, 360, 
relied on this~ rule in upholding an action brought by a majority of 
trustees of a charitable religious corporation against one of the trustees 
to enjoin his breach of trust. Tile, C'ourt quoted section 200, comment c, 
of the Restatement Second of Trusts, 3'Upro., for the rule that "If there 
are several trustees, one or more of them can maintain a suit against 
another to compel him to perform his duti('s under the trust, or to enjoin 
him from ~ommitting a breach of trust. • • ." 
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special emphasis on the "functions and importance of the 
dysfunctions of the musculoskeletal system of the human 
body," on the "intimate interrelationship and natural cura-
tive resources of the human body viewed as a whole," and on 
the "value of manipulative therapy for conditions and ail-
ments of the human body." Students in an osteopathic school 
receive a special and unique education and training in the 
principles of osteopathic medicine not taught at medical 
schools teaching the allopathic theory of medicine. Physicians 
trained at osteopathic schools are known as osteopathic physi-
cians and surgeons, or as osteopaths, and constitute a separate 
and distinct profession practicing the diagnosis and treatment 
of all human ailments. An osteopath receives an unlimited 
physician's and surgeon's license that grants him rights and 
privileges identical with those granted by the license issued 
to a graduate of an allopathic medical school. Osteopathy is 
a growing profession in the United States and is generally 
accepted and recognized as a distinct and separate school and 
theory of medicine. 
At all times since its incorporation in 1914 until about May 
24, 1961, COPS continuously conducted an osteopathic med-
ical and surgical college that trained young men and women 
in osteopathic medicine. Other activities of COPS include 
staffing, teaching, and assisting in the operation of the Los 
Angeles Osteopathic Hospital, a division of the Los Angeles 
County Hospital; carrying on research in osteopathic medi-
cine; conducting a general clinic providing osteopathic medical 
and surgical care; and operating a postgraduate school in 
ost.eopathic medicine and surgery. During this period the 
trustees of COPS have held out to the public and members of 
the osteopathic profession that COPS was an osteopathic 
medical college dedicated to providing training in osteopathic 
medicine. On the basis of such representations, COPS has 
solicited and received donations for use in teaching, research, 
and the general promotion of osteopathy. COPS also has 
actively solicited and received scholarship funds and research 
g-rants from the American Osteopathic Associations, a na-
tional or~anization dedicated to the furtherance of osteopathic 
medicine and surgery in the United States. 
Plaintiffs allege that defendant trustees threaten to divert 
the assets of COPS to purposes other than those for ,vhich 
it was organized and for which COPS }18S in tlle past solicited 
and received funds in trust. The particular acts complained of 
) 
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are (1) on May 24, 1961, defcndant trustees resolved that 
COPS shall perform certain acts contemplated in an agree-
ment between the California Medical Association and the 
California Osteopathic Association, including changing the 
name of COPS so that neither the ,vord "osteopathic" or any 
similar word shall be used, and using its best efforts to obtain 
approval by the Council on Medical Education and Hospi"tals 
of the American Medical Association and to obtain member-
ship in the Association of American Medical Colleges; (2) on 
June 5, 1961, defendant trustees resolved to apply for mem-
bership for COPS in the Association of American Medical 
Colleges, and to apply for approval of COPS by the Council 
on Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical 
Association; (3) COPS has, on the direction of defendant 
trustees, applied to the Association of American Medical Col-
leges for approval as an allopathic medical school, and has 
applied to the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals 
of the American Medical Association to become an approved 
allopathic medical school; (4) on June 5, 1961, defendant 
trustees resolved to amend the articles of incorporation of 
COPS to change its name to "California College of Medicine, " 
and COPS has since filed an amendment with the Secretary of 
State so changing its name; (5) on November 8, 1961, de-
fendant trustees approved an agreement between COPS and 
the California Osteopathic Association in which COPS agreed 
to perform various of the acts already recited and also "to 
assist in the removal of the distinction among any persons 
practicing medicine in the State of California holding an 
unlimited Physician and Surgeon's certificate." 
Plaintiffs contend that the foregoing acts have the purpose 
and effect of abandoning and repUdiating the charitable pur-
pose of COPS to conduct an osteopathic medical and surgical 
college and to convert COPS into a school teaching nonosteo-
pathic medicine and surgery according to the allopathic school 
of. medicine. 
[7] We have concluded that the complaint states a cause 
of action for Fnjoining a threatened breach of a charitable 
trust. If the allegations of the complaint are true, the char-
itable purpose of COPS is primarily to conduct a college of 
osteopathy for the training o'f osteopathic physicians and 
surgeons and for the general furtherance of the profession of 
osteopathy. The complaint sufficiently a)]eges a distinction 
betwt'en osteopathic and allopathic medicine. Consequently, 
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the change of COPS' curriculum or the taking of other steps I,~ 
for the purpose of gaining accreditation as an allopathit'~ 
medical college, and the training of allopathic physicians and l.·-.· 
surgeons, are sufficiently alleged to be acts not within the .. ~ 
purpose of conducting an osteopathic college. <1 
Defendant trustees contend that the differences between the .• ~ 
two branches of medicine are insignificant and that the re-l 
moval of any di~tinction between these branches. would not ,~ 
change the teachmg of osteopathy from that preVIously prac- . i~ 
ticed at COPS. These contentions, however, do not go to the .~ 
sufficiency of the complaint, but only raise issues of the truth .• ~ 
of the allegations of the complaint. .'~ 
Defendant trustees also point out that the articles of COP~ :~ 
provide that it shall establish a college ' 'in which shall ~., 
taught all branches of learning, and instruction which now l 
pertain or which may in the future pertain to the science and J 
art of health maintenance. . • ." This provision justifies the~'~ 
teaching of subjects in allopathic medicine at COPS, and in :i 
fact the complaint alleges that COPS provides ,. training and " 
education equal in scope and subject matter in all respects " 
to the training received by students in medical schools teach-
ing the allopathic school and theory of medicine." The 
purpose of COPS nevertheless is to conduct an osteopathic 
college, and, if the allegations of the complaint are true, the 
teaching of allopathic medicine is proper only insofar as is • 
useful in the training of osteopaths. It is alleged that osteo-
pathic schools place special emphasis on osteopathic theories 
and practices not emphasized in schools of allopathic medicine. 
According to the complaint, the training of osteopaths de- .; 
pends on the emphasis given to various subjects, even though ' 
courses maybe given in allopathic medicine. Whether the 
teaching of allopathic medicine as threatened by defendant 
trustees will change the teaching emphasis at COPS contrary 
to the charitable purpose of conducting an osteopathic college 
presents a question of fact that cannot be decided on demurrer. 
[8] The complaint also states a cause of action for declara-
tory relief. Plaintiffs have alleged that a controversy exists 
between them and defendant trustees over their rights and 
duties as trustees of COPS. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial 
declaration of the char~table purposes of the COPS trust and 
whether certain conduct by COPS trustees would be contrary 
to these purposes and therefore a breach of trust. 
[9] The trial court correctly held that the California 
'.osteopathic Association (hereinafter COA) is an indispen-
-) 
) 
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aable party to this action. Since plaintiffs seek to enjoin the 
performance by COPS of a contract between COPS and COA, 
·.the effect of a decree in favor of plaintiffs would be to enjoin 
COA as well as COPS. COA is therefore an indispensable 
party. (Miracle Adhesives Corp. v. Peninsula Tile Contractors 
Assn., 157 Ca1.App.2d 591, 593-594: {321 P.2d 4:82] ; Code Civ. 
Proc., § 389.) Plaintiffs should be given leave to amend to 
join COA as a party defendant. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J.~andPeek, J., con-
curred. 
MoCOMB, J.-I dissent. In my. opinion, this is the sole 
guestion necessary to determine: Did the three minority 
trustees have the capacity to sue the corporation without the 
consent of the Attorney General' 
No. Only the Attorney General may bring an action to 
correct noncompliance with a trust assumed by a charitable 
corporation. 
The affairs of either a private corporation or a charitable 
corporation are managed by a majority of the board of direc-
tors or board of trustees of the corporation (Corp. Code, 
§§ 800, 10205),1 and the Corporations Code contains no pro-
vision to permit a minority of the directors or trustees, 
as such, to question action taken by the majority.2 
ISection 800 of the Corporations Code provides: "Subject to limita-
tions of the articles and of this division as to action wljjeh shall be 
authorized or approved by the shareholders, an corporate powers shall 
be aereised by or under authority of, aDd the business aDd affairs of 
every corporation shall be eontrolled by, a board of not less thaD three 
directors. ' , 
Section 10205 of the Corporations Code provides~ "Subject to the 
provisions of the articles of incorporation [of a charitable corporation], 
the aercise of the powers of the corporation, with the rigbt to delegate 
to officers and agents the performance of duties and tlte exercise of pow-
ers, shall be vested in a board of trustees •• , 
Under section 10201 of the Corporations Code, a charitable corpora-
tion is require«\ to have not 1e88 than 9, Dor more than 25, trustees. 
2Unlike California, New York specifically permits a director or oflicer 
of a corporation, as sueh, to institute and maintain a suit questioDing 
action taken by ODe or more of Sle other directors or officers thereof. 
(N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law, II 60, 61; see Teflfley v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204 
[189 N.Y.B.2d 158. 160 N.E.2d 463, 467].) Without sueb .tatutory 
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If a private corporation engages in unauthorized business, 
either a shareholder of the corporation or the State may enjoin 
the doing or continuation of such business by the corporation. 
{Corp. Code, § 803.)1 
Where a charitable corporation bas failed to comply with 
any trust which it has assumed, or where such a corporation 
has departed from the general purpose for which it was 
formed, the Attorney General is required to institute the pro-
ceedings necessary to correct the noncompliance or departure. 
(Corp. Code, § 10207.)· No provision has been made for such 
a right to be exercised by any other person. 
The provisions of the General Corporation Law (Corp. 
Code, §§ 1-8999) are made applicable to corporations formed 
under the General Nonprofit Corporation Law (Corp. Code, 
§§ 9000-10703) except as to matters specifically otherwise pro-
vided for (Corp. Code, § 9002). However, the matter of who is 
entitled to bring an action for ultra vires acts of the officers 
or directors of a charitable corporation is "specifically other-
wise provided for" by section 10207 of the Corporations Code. 
Therefore, no action may be filed under section 803 of the 
Corporations Code with respect to a charitable corporation. 
In any event, however, although "shareholder" is defined 
to include a member of a nonstock corporation (Corp. Code, 
requirement that the affairs of the corporation be managed by the board. 
(See Goldman and Kwestel, Director', S:atutorg Action in New Yor17 
(1961) 36 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 199, 202.) 
ISection 803 of the Corporations Code provides: .. The statement in 
the articles of the objects, purposes, powers, and authorized business of 
the corporation constitutes, as between the corporation and its directors, 
omcers, or shareholders, an authorization to the directors and a limita-
tion upon the actual authority of the representatives of the corporation. 
Such limitations may be asserted in a proceeding by a shareholder or 
the State, to enjoin the doing or continuation of unauthorized businesa 
by the corporation or its omcers, or both, in eases where third parties 
have not acquired rights thereby, or to dissolve the corporation, or in • 
proceeding by the corporation or by the shareholders suing in a repre-
sentative suit, against t1le omcers or directors of t1le corporation for 
violation of thei~ authority •••• " 
·Section 10207 of t1le Corporations Code provides: «« Each such cor-
poration [charitable corporation] sh~lI De subject at all times to exam· 
ination by the Attorney General, on behalf of the State, to ascertain the 
condition of its affairs and to what extent, if at all, it may faU to 
comply with trusts whic!l it has assumed or may depart from the general 
purpose for wl1ich it is formed. In case of any such failure or departure 
the Attorney General shall institute, in the name of the State, the pro-
ceedings necessary to correet the noneompliance or departure .... " (See 
also Corp. Code, f 9505.) 
) 
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§ 103), no showing has bren made that plaintiffs are members 
of defendant college. Ii 
Accordingly, plaintiffs lacked capacity to bring the present 
action.s 
I am of the opinion that we should not disapprove the 
holding in George Peppcrcline Foundation v. Pcppcrclinc, 126 
Cal.App.2d 154 [271 P.2d 600], in which this court unani-
mously denied a hearing. 
That case was decided in 1954 and has, presumably, been 
the law for 10 years. There is no way of telling how many 
citizens have followed the law as stated in that case or how 
many trial courts have rendered judgments relying thereon. 
The Legislature has met on numerous occasions and has not 
seen fit to overrule the decision or to change the law as set 
forth therein. It could llave done so very simpl~' by amending 
II" Member" includes each person signing the articles of a nonstock 
corporation and each person admitted to membership therein (Corp. 
Code, § 104), and under certain circumstances the persons 011 the con· 
trolling board of a nonprofit COl'poration are reg:mletl ns memb~rs (Corp. 
Code, § 9603). 
sAlthough plaintiffs and the indiyidunl defendantll are designated 
"trustees," they are not trustees in the strict. sense, since the title to the 
property of the corporation is in the corporation and not in them. (Bain-
bridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal.2d 423, 428 [2,3J [106 P.2d 423); Brown v. 
Memorial Nat. Home Foundation, 162 Cal.App.2d 513, 540 [23] et seq. 
[329 P.2d 118, 75 A.L.R.2d 427) [hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; 
see Rest.2d Trusts (1959) § 16 A, com. a, p. 52.) 
Whether or not plaintiffs could maintain this action if they and the 
individual defendants were trustees of a charitable trust, rather 'than 
members of the controlling board of a charitable corporation, is a ques-
tion not now before us. There is, however, substantial authority to the 
effect that one of several trustees of a charitable trust may maintain an 
action against the others to enforce the trust or to compel the redress 
of a breach of trust. (See Rest.2d Trusts (1959) § 391, p. 278; 4 Scott, 
Trusts (2d ed. 1956) § 891, p. 2757. Cf. O'Hara v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T., 
218 Cal. 131, 140 [4] [2 P.2d 21].) 
In George Pepperdine Foundation v. Pepperdine, 126 Cal.App.2d 154, 
161 [3]' [271 P.2d 600], an action by a charitable corporation against 
its former directors for damages resulting from "dissipation of its 
assets through illegal and speculative transactions and mismanagement 
of its affairs" by the defendants during their incumbenei!'s, tIle Distrjrt 
Court of Appeal held that the Attorney General was the only person 
qualified to maintain an action on behalf of a benevolent, public, chari-
table trust whose beneficiaries were of an indefinite class of persons, 
and that the plaintiff therefore' lacked capacity to bring the action. 
Although the language used by the District Court of Appeal refers to 
charitable trusts, and not to charitable corporations, the plaintiff there 
involved was, in fact, a charitable corporation. 
\ 
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section 10207 of the Corporations Code, which at that time 
vested, and now vests, in the Attorney General the sole au-
thority to bring an action to correct noncompliance with a 
trust assumed by a charitable corporation. 
In my opinion, in the absence ofa showing that a prior 
decision was rendered through (1) corruption or (2) an 
obvious mistake, or (3) that conditions have changed making 
it inapplicable, the doctrine of stare decisis should be fol-
lowed by this court so that the District Courts of Appeal, 
the trial courts, and lawyers may know what the established 
law is. Thus, trial courts will be in a position to render uni-
form decisions on similar facts, and lawyers will be able to 
advise their clients as to the course they should follow. (See 
People v. Hines, ante, pp. 164, 182 etseq. [37 Ca1.Rptr. 622, 
390 P.2d 398].) 
My views on this subject are well expressed by the Hon-
orable Paul R. Hutchinson, President of the Los Angeles 
County Bar Association, as follows: 
"History records that when tyrants take over governments 
the first thing they do is suspend the judicial processes or, 
worse, select judges to do their bidding without regard for 
established law. 
"Uncivilized governments of history were corrupt because 
their courts were not dependable. Justice was subject to the 
whim of the court. The law was whatever the Court said 
was the law. There was no stability-there was no assurance 
that the law on which men relied would still be the law when 
their rights reached the courts for adjudication. 
"The common law set out to end this fickle, unreliable, un-
stable, capricious and sometimes corrupt system by adopting 
a system that called for adherence to established law. Btare 
decisis, we called it, which Bouvier defines as meaning, 'To 
abide by, or adhere to decided cases. It is a general maxim 
that when a point of law has been settled by decision, it 
forms a precedent which is not afterwards to be departed 
from. . . • Where there have been a series of decisions by the 
supreme judicial tribunal of a state, the rule of stare decisis 
may usually be regarded as impregnable, except by legislative 
act.' , 
"This doctrine was the crowning glory of the common law 
and of American jurisprudence. ,By it we became a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men. 'The law' was the established 
law of the people. They provided the soundest basis for de-
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termining the law by which they chose to be governed. If 
they thought a law was bad they could change it. But until 
they did so, the judge enforced it. Be could not arrogate to 
himself the right to change the law and substitute his opinion 
for the established law of the people. 
,. We prospered under this rule, while less stable govern-
ments 1l0undered all around us. Not in any country, at any 
time or era, was so much even-handed justice dispensed to 
the people. We were the envy of other people in other lands. 
They beat upon our gates for admission to our country like 
waves upon a dike. They came here by the millions. For they 
knew that, in spite of faults, that sometimes appeared, the sys-
tem was so much bigger than the faults, that through it we 
had made one of the great contributions to man's eternal effort 
to establish justice among all men. 
"Granted that the law should never be wholly inflexible; 
granted that changing conditions call for changing interpreta- , 
tions to prevent injustices stemming from an adherence to 
form that is so slavish it is blind to the heart and soul of the 
legal principle being ruled on, these exceptions should never 
justify a court re-writing the organic'laws people have or-
dained for themselves without great and compelling reasons 
that find substantial support among the thinking people of the 
Country .••• " (89 Los Angeles Bar Bulletin (July 1964) 
321-822.) 
". • • I cannot but conclude that there is a strong feeling 
arising among thinking lawyers that it is time to speak out to 
restore our fundamental system of checks and balances in 
government, which concept was one of the greatest contribu-
tions our Constitution made to organized governments 
throughout the world. 
"Under this system the court construes the laws of the 
people. In construing them, it should not make Dew and 
fundamental laws Dot arising by fair implication from the 
laws at hand, for if it does it usurps the law-making power of 
the people and their legislative representatives. 
"It is ,DO valid answer that a majority of the justices 
think that the law they make is good law. We are not, under 
the Constitution, Dor caD we permit ourselves to become by 
construction or by default, a government by a shifting ma-
jority of the members of the Supreme Court. 
"Nor should the Court's impatience to achieve reforms 
justify its refusal to appJy established law. Roscoe Pound 
was perhaps America t8 greatest jurist. His death this month 
prompts me to quote from his masterful address on 'The 
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice.' It has been re-published by the American Judiciary 
Society. Because basic truths never change, it comes as a 
surprise to learn that the remarks 80 apt were delivered in 
1906. He said: 
" 'Public opinion must affect the administration of justice 
through the rules by which justice is administered rather than 
through the direct administration. All interference with the 
uniform and automatic applications of these rules, when ac-
tual controversies arise, induces an anti-legal element which 
becomes intolerable .... We must pay a price for certainty 
and uniformity.' If (39 Los Angeles Bar Bulletin (Aug. 1964) 
379-380.) 
I would affirm the judgment. 
The petition of respondent College and respondent trustees 
for a rehearing was denied September 24, 1964. Mosk, J. t did 
not participate therein. McComb, J., was of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
